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RMP COMPLIANCE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
SUMMARY
After the Clean Air Act Amendments became finalized in 1996, the subsequent
requirement of Risk Management Plan (RMP) submission by certain large chemical facilities to
the EPA1 was mandated within 3 years. Because of the complexity of many environmental
regulations on facilities and the natural gap created by different levels (and agencies) of
Government, total compliance with this most important emergency planning regulation could not
be verified. My project is meant to assist in bridging the gap between the Local and State
knowledge of facility information and assisting the EPA in identifying all potential RMP
facilities. By sharing information in both directions, my hope is also to narrow the gap among
emergency planning entities to ultimately make the community a safer place.
In conjunction with the Philadelphia Fire Department, HazMat Administrative Unit
(HMAU), my project initially involves working with the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office (CEPPO) of the EPA Region III2 to ensure maximum facility compliance for
Risk Management Plans for the city/county of Philadelphia.

After acquiring the entire chemical

database from the HMAU, 3 we broke down the facilities in a manageable format and proceeded
to contact the numerous companies listed to confirm or make certain that quantities were correct
on the SARA forms. Although other informational sources were utilized and considered, this
database proved to be the most fruitful. Using techniques and data analysis compiled from this
1

United States Environmental Protection Agency; the branch of the Federal Government charged with
implementing the CAAA.
2
EPA region III is the geographical area comprised of PA, MD, DEL, VA, W VA & Wash DC
3
Listing of all facilities that filed “Tier II” chemical inventory forms that are required by the Superfund
Amendments & Re-authorization Act (SARA –Title III) of 1986.
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effort, we hope to apply lessons learned to use for the remainder of the State and Region III to
assist in attaining 100% compliance of RMP throughout the region.
INTRODUCTION:
INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, I was assigned to the firehouse, Engine 29, as a new, rookie Fireman
straight out of Fire school, at 4th St & Girard Ave. in the Northern liberties section of
Philadelphia. Besides being almost overwhelmed by the constant action that this busy station
afforded me, there was something that made an even deeper impression on my psyche, which
molded much of my thinking today. In the rear of the apparatus floor, there was a trophy case
commemorating one of the most tragic fires that ever occurred in the Philadelphia Fire
Department history. There were seven helmets, which were worn by the brave Philadelphia
Firemen, who succumbed to a fire and explosion that happened in the Berg chemical factory at
5th & Berks Sts. in North Philadelphia in 19544. As a result of this fire, the City of Philadelphia
established the famous Thrill show and subsequent “Hero Scholarship Fund,” which attempts to
compensate the surviving families for their loss due to this event and any other Police or Fireman
family that suffers this supreme sacrifice.
I spent many an agonizing night thinking how these deaths may have been prevented and
although the job of a firefighter is inherently dangerous, these lives could have been saved. One
of the many benefits that have come from this country’s environmental regulations is safety
precautions that chemical facilities must enact to prevent accidents in their workplace. Coupled
with the pre-planning requirements that the emergency response community bears in conjunction
with the facility, many unknown hazards (such as the alien chemical mixture in the tank at the
Berg laboratories) have been eliminated. When I fast-forwarded twenty years later as a

4

See www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/8010427.htm for recent historical account entitled “They Died For Us”
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Hazardous Material (HazMat) Lieutenant, I was charged with the responsibility to act as the
“SARA”5 coordinator for the Fire Department, and thus became an avid inspector, vigilantly
looking for these potential hazardous facility locations. Ever since I entered the MES program, I
assumed that I would be working on some type of Capstone that would be linked to my
background; this project fits the bill perfectly.
During my previous experience as a HazMat investigator and SARA Title III
Coordinator for the Philadelphia Fire Department, I saw the need for cooperation and assistance
between the Federal EPA and local agencies. Specifically, when the requirements for the Clean
Air Act Amendments (CAAA) Risk Management Plans (RMP) were finalized in June 1996, I
knew there had to be some bridging of regulatory philosophies in order to accomplish the
ultimate goal of total compliance of all RMP facilities. Thus, being a former and current
member of the Philadelphia and Chester County Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPC), I felt that I had the right background to provide a conduit to assist all affected entities.
This project and subsequent Capstone thesis should provide a “win-win-win” situation that
should benefit everyone. Not only should this meet my client’s needs of compliance, but the
RMP info should enhance the future emergency planning requirements for these facilities that
can assist the LEPC and the Fire Department.
DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
Working with my Client (EPA, Region 3, CEPPO office), we hope to have identified any
potential facility that is required to file Risk Management Plans in the Philadelphia area. Along
with the ultimate goal of ensuring 100% compliance in the City of Philadelphia (the goal of my
client), an analysis was developed to determine the types of facilities that have already filed,

5

Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986
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along with their respective chemical inventories. We will then develop a template of knowing
which facilities to target as we proceed along to this final capstone. While performing this
analysis, all information will be updated and shared in both directions with the Fire Department
HMAU,6 LEPC and the EPA.
CLIENT MISSION:
EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) provides
leadership, builds partnerships, and offers technical assistance to: prevent and prepare for
chemical emergencies; respond to environmental crises; inform the public about chemical
hazards in their community; and share lessons learned about chemical accidents.7 EPA’s Region
III office, based in downtown Philadelphia @ 1650 Arch St., has as its’ CEPPO chief, Mr. Jerry
Heston. His team of Perry Pandya (Ch E), Jennifer Shoemaker (Ch E, PM), Mike Welsh (PE,
OSC), Al Baginski (PE, DEE) and Bill McHale (PE)8 are assisting in this initiative.
HISTORY:
Ever since the catastrophic, toxic release of Methyl Isocyanate at a Union Carbide plant
in Bhopal, India in December, 1984, which killed over 2,000 people and injured thousands
others, there has been a strong federal government movement in this country to protect against
this kind of event ever happening in the United States. As a result, initially in 1986, Congress
enacted SARA Title III, aka, EPCRA9, which mandated facilities to report chemical storage
above certain thresholds to three (3) distinct entities: Fire Departments, LEPC’s10 and the State
Emergency Response Commission (SERC). This reporting mechanism served as the basis for
6

Phila. Fire Dept’s. Hazardous Material Administrative Unit-the unit that processes SARA Tier II forms
http: yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/mission.htm
8
Because of budget cutbacks, Mr. Pandya & Baginski were not available during the latter part of the project
9
Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act
10
SARA also created LEPC’s, which were made up of representatives of industry, government and related entities
affecting the community
7
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chemical emergency preparedness. When LEPC’s received this information from facilities on
“Tier II” forms, companies that showed Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS’s) above
respective thresholds11, needed to have an “Off-site” emergency response plan formulated by the
committees. These “worse case scenario” plans gave a footprint into the community of a toxic
material release and describe how the emergency response community would have handled a
release.
In 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) were passed and initiated a
requirement for facilities who had very large quantities of certain toxics and flammables12 to
develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP), based on their “Off-site consequence analysis” of a
release of a chemical in process. This requirement was not finalized until June 1996, and it gave
facilities three years to comply. In addition to requiring facilities to develop release response and
prevention activities, it also mandated facilities to send their RMP’s into EPA for review and
initially required community unveiling, which was later scaled back because of Terrorism
awareness. What is significant to note is that many SARA chemicals (although not all) are also
RMP chemicals, but the thresholds are much higher for RMP filing.13 The other significant point
of these two comparisons is where this information is required to be filed. Tier II chemical
inventory forms are sent on an annual basis to three Local and State government representatives;
RMP information is sent to the Federal EPA. Now one can understand why a BRIDGE must be
formed to combine the compliance efforts and benefit from each one’s informational base.

11

40 CFR, part 355, appendices A & B contains the listing of EHS’s and related Threshold Planning Quantities
40 CFR, part 68 delineates provisions for these 77 acutely toxics and 63 flammables.
13
A listing of both chemical criteria can be found in EPA’s publication: “List of Lists”, Oct. 2001. See:
www.epa.gov.ceppo
12
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INITIAL ACTIVITIES:
ACTIVITIES
For this project, we identified all potential RMP facilities in Philadelphia by midNovember and followed-up with verification by the first week of December. Concurrent with
the compliance issue, an analysis was developed as a prediction for future RMP projects. The
following are the initial steps taken:
•

Visited the region 3 reading room14 to identify all current RMP’s listed on EPA’s national
database. This database, dated June 2003, listed approximately 20 facilities, some of
which I knew had previously gone out of business.

•

Several phone calls were made to CEPPO to set up a series of meetings (roughly every 2
weeks) beginning on Sept. 30th, to discuss strategies. The initial meeting unveiled the
more current RMP database from CEPPO, which had only 16 facilities listed. After
consulting with the Fire Department, I later informed CEPPO that two had “downsized”
their inventory, leaving only 14 current RMP facilities for the county.

•

A meeting was convened with the Phila. Fire Dept. / HMAU to discuss this project and
obtain their “SARA” Database. Of the more than 400 facilities identified, over 140
contain Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS’s) above their thresholds, while the
remainder has other hazardous substances more than 10,000 lbs. All of the
approximately 360 EHS’s established by SARA are by definition, extremely toxic, and
thus are a good barometer for the toxics list for RMP. The remaining RMP flammable
category and some other toxics may be found in the SARA category of other hazardous
substances over 10,000 lb. Also, as part of this initiative, I offered my assistance to the
HMAU for any future Emergency planning issues stemming from our results.

14

Located in the EPA bldg. @ 1650 Arch St.
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•

During the November PLEPC bi-monthly meeting, Mr. Heston and I informed the
committee of our initiative.

•

In subsequent meetings with CEPPO, we agreed to divide the SARA list up and
attempted to compare both criteria. From there, a rough list was developed for further
research.

METHOD OF RESEARCH/SOURCES OF DATA:
DATA
Using the list of toxics and flammables provided by EPA, we compared this list to the
SARA database from the PFD. Because SARA requires only a reporting range and not an exact
amount, there is some question whether the proper thresholds are being met. A potential list of
approximately 15 facilities was created that may be RMP facilities due to the SARA range
within RMP thresholds. Another 20 companies have the potential chemicals, but show below the
range. In both cases, these needed further verification. Another possible inadequacy with SARA
is that the information is already dated when it is received. SARA, Tier II forms are due on
March 1st every year, for chemicals that were on hand the previous year. As one can see, this is
one possible inadequate source of data to be resolved.
Another inadequate source is the OSHA database of Process Safety Management
(PSM).15 Many similar chemical thresholds and subsequent requirements exist for PSM
facilities and RMP’s. The main problem is that OSHA does not have a central database of filers;
they mandate hazard analysis in their processes, but the records remain on site, not sent to
OSHA. After several inquiry attempts, I successfully found that the only real listing that’s
available as public information is the list of facilities that had been cited for non-compliance of
PSM’s after an OSHA inspection was conducted. Even though this may only be a partial list,
15

See 29 CFR 1910.119 promulgated by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration of the U.S. Dept. Of
Labor
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some information is better than none. By citing the Freedom of Information Act,16 I wrote a
formal letter to the regional Administrator requesting this information for the entire region III of
OSHA, which takes in the same States as EPA’s region III. In January, I received a reply listing
all facilities in region 3 of OSHA that have been cited for PSM violations due to an inspection
since 1990. This “limited” list will be reviewed against the SARA list.
Other sources of information that EPA has used in the past are the other databases that
are compiled on their website known as “Envirofacts.”17 These databases integrate many
previous regulatory efforts by EPA into one central location that can be used to compare
facilities that generate hazardous waste, emit toxics into the environment, or have permits for
other concerns. This information was previously reviewed by EPA/CEPPO, but may be revisited
as the need arises.
ANALYSIS:
ANALYSIS
Applying the “Environmental Management” class lesson on environmental indicators to
this project, one might feel that this command and control project is dealing strictly with lowlevel regulatory inputs. Actually, because health and safety issues are at the core of the
emergency planning process, the highest priority to protect responders and the community in
general ensures prime value to this project. It also serves as a confidence builder, knowing that
much is being done to keep our community safe, and should an emergency arise, the potential for
saving unnecessary injuries and deaths may never actually be measured, but is priceless.
If one wanted to prioritize the potential risk of these facilities, there are a few barometers
that could be met when dealing with the specific chemicals. One category of poisonous
chemicals has assigned values for RMP known as “toxic endpoints.” These can be defined as the
16
17

Passed by congress in 1966 and amended in 1974.
See www.epa.gov/enviro
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maximum airborne concentration below which is believed individuals could be exposed to for up
to one hour without experiencing serious health effects.18 This is part of the “dose-response”
assessment when EPA looks at Risk Characterization. The other category of RMP chemicals is
the flammables. All of these materials must have a National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA)19 rating of 4 for flammability, which is the highest degree of hazard because of having
liquid flashpoints below 73 degrees F. and boiling points below 100 degrees F. The potential of
these flammables is calculated based on the 1 lb. overpressure distance of the vapor cloud
explosion.
Another potential method of prioritizing the risk associated with these highly hazardous
substances is to compare the “Threshold Quantities” that EPA assigns to RMP toxics. For the 77
acutely toxic materials, there is a range from a low of 500 lbs. (assigned to the chemical
Phosgene, which has been identified as a potential chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction,
WMD),20 to the high of 20,000 lbs. (for Ammonium Hydroxide and nine other somewhat less
toxic materials).
For our purposes on this immediate project, any SARA facility that meets the criteria for
RMP in Philadelphia will be studied equally. The number of facilities is not that great and
meeting the already large criteria puts all of these companies in a risk class by themselves; EPA
assigns a high “threshold” for disclosure on RMP’s for these potent chemicals. 21

18

According to the Emergency Response Planning Guideline 2 (ERPG-2) developed by the American Industrial
Hygiene Association
19
National Fire Protection Association 704 Standard for Identification of Hazards of Materials
20
As determined by the Dept. of Justice; see Law Enforcement Response to WMD, a 16 hr. course geared to the
Police response community, DOJ/LSU
21
See “List of Lists”, last column entitled “CAA 112® TQ”
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CURRENT RMP DATA:
DATA
The most current data on file at CEPPO for Philadelphia lists the following chemicals,
and I have them ranked by their toxic endpoints:
Hazardous Substance

# of Facilities

Toxic Endpoint

Chlorine

3

(.0087)

Oleum

2

(.010)

Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)

1

(.016)

Hydrochloric Acid (HCL)

1

(.026)

Anhydrous Ammonia

7

(.14)

An interesting coincidence with these 14 chemicals is that they all are considered
“corrosives”; which is the effect they have on moist human tissue when one comes in contact
with them. Not every “EHS” is toxic by its caustic effect on the body; some exhibit poisonous
effects through other methods.
Note that Anhydrous Ammonia and Chlorine comprise 10 of the 14 (71%) of the total
facilities. According to our CEPPO office, this is slightly less than the national average, which is
approximately 80%. This information will be useful as we proceed to the remainder of the State
and region.
An analysis of the type of RMP facilities shows most of the Anhydrous Ammonia22
facilities are cold storage food warehouses, while one is the main distributor of Ammonia in this
area. The three Chlorine facilities are water treatment plants, which eventually are planning to

22

Anhydrous Ammonia is 100% gaseous Ammonia without water
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switch to a weaker solution of Sodium Hypochlorite23; this future action will eventually de-list
them from RMP requirements. The remaining four are: 2 chemical distributors, 1 pesticide
distributor, and 1 refinery.
Clearly, based on the toxic endpoint, Chlorine would be the riskiest chemical to the
community and thus would have the largest impact for a potential release area. Another
important fact about Chlorine is the type of container that is used to transport it. Generally, one
will find Chlorine either in “1 ton containers” or 90-ton rail cars. A release from either one of
these pressurized vessels will generally only get worse because of the corrosive effect of the
hydrochloric acid24; therefore an impact area will be affected in less time than many other
chemicals. The cold storage facilities would pose the least risk among the RMP facilities, not
only because of the higher toxic endpoint, but also because Anhydrous Ammonia has a very low
odor threshold. When the average person begins to detect Ammonia odor, they generally have
plenty of time to escape before they succumb to its hazardous effects.25

23

Sodium Hypochlorite contains approx. 12.5% Chlorine in solution
Hydrochloric acid is formed when water comes in contact with Chlorine gas.
25
Odor detectable by most people is 25 ppm, according to “Emergency Response to Ammonia Incidents”,
PFD/HMAU, Dec. 1993
24
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PHILADELPHIA RMP CHEMICALS (Facilities)
7
7

6

5

4
# of Facilities
3
3

# of Facilities

2
2
1

Toxic Endpoint

1
1

-0.0087

-0.01

-0.016

-0.026

-0.14

0

-1
Chlorine

Oleum

Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrogen Fluoride
(HCL)
(HF)
Toxic Endpoints (PPM)

Anhydrous Ammonia

REGION III RMP DATA:
As a comparison to these 14 facilities in Philadelphia, the following other information is
shown for the rest of the region (by State):
PA

=

418

VA

=

187

MD

=

124

W VA

=

86

DEL

=

37

DC

=

2
(854 Total)26

RMP’S IN REGION 3 (as of 11/03)

26

From the Ceppo “intranet” info at EPA region III
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(In Nov.1999, EPA listed a total of 16,517 RMP’s nationwide in their Envirofacts database on
the Internet; 468 in PA).27
POTENTIAL FACILITIES:
The following represents Hazardous Substances that have been reported on SARA forms
by facilities that have the potential threshold criteria for RMP: 28
TOXICS:

Hydrochloric Acid (HCL), Hydrofluoric Acid (HF), Nitric Acid, and
Ammonium Hydroxide

FLAMMABLES:

Ethylene, Dimethylamine (Propane has been also listed on many Tier II
forms, but recently has been exempted from RMP’s if used as fuel)29

FINDINGS:
FINDINGS:
The flammable Ethylene, which is the primary component in Natural Gas, is also
exempted from RMP’s for similar reasons as Propane; it is being held for sale as a fuel. The
facility using Dimethylamine was determined to have incorrectly over-reported their quantity of
this product on their Tier II form; they had less than 10,000 lbs.
The toxics breakdown was as follows:
•

6 Facilities had HCL, but their total aggregate was less than 15,000 lbs., which is
the RMP threshold. The quantity must be more than a 37% concentration and
then you need to reach the above threshold. Ironically, HCL was de-listed from
SARA EHS thresholds shortly after SARA was enacted, due to strong industry
lobbyist efforts.

27

From www.epa.gov/ceppo, which has since been removed from the public eye due to Terrorism concerns
On the tier II form, the range indicated for most of these substances was between 10,000 & 100,000 lbs.; while for
HF the range was 1,000 to 10,000 lbs. RMP criteria doesn’t use ranges, it‘s more specific.
29
This exemption is due to lobbyists arguing that many facilities use Propane only as a backup for fuel shortage
supplies in extreme weather and or other unusual circumstances.
28
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•

6 Facilities had Ammonia Hydroxide30 and although they appeared to reach the
thresholds, the percentage of Ammonia in water needed to be greater than 20 and
it had to exceed 20,000 lbs. This threshold was not met.

•

1 Facility had Nitric Acid greater than 15,000 lbs., but not at the 80% or greater
mixture that RMP’s mandate.

•

1 Facility had HF above the 1,000 lb. threshold, but not at the required 50%
mixture.

All of these toxics were also “corrosives.”
NOTE: Due to new security concerns after 9-11, the facility information cannot be
openly disclosed to the general public, although all of our emergency entities involved will be
given the entire information, if desired. Although we cannot use specific company names, the
following represents the type of facilities that use the corresponding Chemicals:

TOXICS
Ammon.Hydroxide

HCL

Nitric Acid

HF

Paper company

Chem. dist

Chem. distributor

Auto clean. supplier

Water treatment

Electric parts

Container mfr

Metal refinisher

Steam energy supplier

Rail yard

Cleaner mfr/dist

Cleaner mfr/dist

Chemical distributor

Paper co.

30

Ammonium Hydroxide is the dilute form of Ammonia in a solution of water. This is considered a strong caustic
material.
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FLAMMABLES
Ethylene

Dimethylamine

Gas company

Chemical distributor

CHEMICALS (Facilities) w/in RMP range
Dimethylamine, 1, 5%
Ethylene, 1, 5%
HF, 1, 5%
Ammonia Hydroxide, 6,
40%%
Nitric Acid, 1, 5%

HCL,6, 40%
Ammonia Hydroxide

HCL

Nitric Acid

HF

Ethylene

Dimethylamine

FACILITIES LISTING RMP CHEMICALS ON THEIR TIER II,
BUT SHOWING BELOW RANGE
The following Hazardous substances are from facilities that indicated RMP chemicals in
the range below the RMP criteria; we determined we needed to verify this information to make
certain. Even though all facilities fell below the requirements, many were close enough to
ascertain total storage.

15

Hazardous Substance

RMP Threshold

# of Facilities

Anhydrous Ammonia

10,000 lbs.

7

Nitric Acid

15,000 lbs.

4

Formaldehyde

15,000 lbs.

2

Hydrofluoric Acid

1,000 lbs.

2

Chlorine

2,500 lbs.

1

Hydrochloric Acid

15,000 lbs.

1

Acetylene

10,000 lbs.

1

Cyclohexanone

10,000 lbs.

1

Facilities w/ Chemicals below TPQ

Formaldehyde, 2

Ammonia

HF, 2

Nitric Acid

Chlorine, 1
HCL, 1

Formaldehyde

Nitric Acid, 4

HF
Other, 3

Acetylene, 1

Chlorine
Cyclohexanone, 1

HCL
Acetylene

Ammonia, 7

Cyclohexanone

Even though all of the above facilities indicated lower quantities than the RMP threshold,
it was important to ascertain exact amounts because of some prior knowledge about how
facilities report chemicals. Sometimes there is confusion of how long a substance must be on

16

hand in order to report it on a Tier II. Even if a material is there for one minute, it also qualifies
for storage requirements. By double-checking with these facilities, we were also letting them
know the potential for any future compliance requirements, should they decide to increase their
inventory.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR PHILADELPHIA COUNTY:
COUNTY
As the above data makes evident, despite placing all of the facilities under a microscope,
we were unable to find any that were not already in compliance with our regulatory effort. At
face value, it would appear that this initiative was not necessary, but in actuality, there can be
many benefits that came from our efforts. First of all, much information has been updated from
both the RMP facilities and from some SARA facilities. We have shared these updates with the
affected entities. It has also become evident that through the efforts of many concerned groups
such as the PLEPC, the PFD/HMAU and region III of EPA, a great deal of information has been
disseminated to facilities throughout this county and the subsequent messages have been
received. This confirms that this region has been successful in accomplishing its mission, and
our efforts have validated this point. During the years following the SARA mandates, the
HMAU and the PLEPC, coupled with the enforcement actions of EPA/CEPPO were extremely
pro-active in trying to identify all possible chemical facilities. Making them aware of
environmental regulations in general, probably helped to keep them abreast of the newer laws
such as the Clean Air Act Amendments’ RMP. Our project has also helped to ensure
cooperation between different government levels, which can be invaluable during a subsequent
emergency.

17

FUTURE BENEFITS:
As we proceed forward to study the remainder of PA and region III, there have been
some concrete analysis factors that can be used. First, the exact percentage of certain substances
is especially vital when it comes to RMP compliance issues. With SARA, once specific
substances were identified, the only other real criterion for compliance issues was the total
quantity that could be found at any one time. Secondly, percentage of substances was not nearly
as important as with the RMP corrosives. Whether through shear accident or if this was
purposely planned, there are built-in incentives by EPA to reduce inventory of hazardous
substances. Either by keeping percentages down or reducing of inventory, many facilities can
eliminate the need for sometimes-expensive compliance paperwork. In the long run, this is also
beneficial to the community because they will not need to be concerned about a large hazardous
release.
Looking at our current and potential RMP facilities, there are common prime, potential
other companies that can be looked at as a first priority when we go outside of Philadelphia
County. It’s apparent that all cold storage facilities, water treatment plants and chemical
distributors should all be scrutinized to make sure their inventories are identified. We can also
compare some of the similar smaller companies that came close to the threshold in Philadelphia;
in a larger rural area, space isn’t as much of a premium and therefore inventories may be larger.
Looking at the remainder of the State, there are some specific informational sources that
need to be studied. Instead of contacting each one of the 67 individual LEPC’s associated with
each county of PA, we will go over the SARA information that was sent to “Pennsafe” (State of
PA entity that receives a copy of the Tier II form). In January, EPA contacted this PA
Department of Labor and Industry division, requesting all of the Tier II information that was sent

18

to the State, in order to sift out the Extremely Hazardous Substances and any extremely
flammables. Because of the large volume of information, Pennsafe suggested to just look at two
major possible RMP chemicals, and compare this listing to what already has been filed. In the
future, we can then look at other RMP chemicals that have been filed on Tier II forms,
prioritizing them based on quantities disclosed.
We have recently received a 62-page report listing all of the facilities in the State that file
Tier II forms for either Chlorine or Anhydrous Ammonia. Of the over 1,000 facilities31 that
reported, 113 are listed having Anhydrous Ammonia over 10,000 lbs. Assuming that this
information is still accurate, and because this is the threshold for RMP purposes, we can make
the assumption that this is the same number of facilities required to file RMP’s based on
Ammonia. The number of Chlorine facilities that reported having quantities exceeding 1,000
lbs. numbered 210. Remembering that the RMP threshold is 2500 lbs., we can make the
assumption that some of these facilities may exceed the threshold, although some may not. This
listing needs further investigation.

31

This 1,000 facility number is only an approximate value that is estimated because we don’t have the entire
database
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PA "Tier II" Facility list
1200
1000
800
600
400

1,000

200
0
# of Tier II facilities
w/NH3 or Cl2

113

210

# of NH3 over 10,000
lbs.

# of Cl2 facilities over
1,000 lbs.

Ammonia & Chlorine

From this listing of Ammonia and Chlorine facilities, we will then compare the current
RMP database in region 3. This comparison should give us a fairly accurate listing of any
potential non-compliance facilities. While EPA has not made a final decision on how they will
enforce any non-compliance, these facilities will definitely be put on notice of their
responsibilities for RMP’s.
Another central database source from the State of PA would be the listing of “Off-site”
plan facilities that reside with the PA Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). These plans,
which are submitted to PEMA for approval, by each individual county, should list all facilities
that have Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS) above their respective thresholds for
Emergency planning purposes. Keep in mind that not all Tier II substances are considered
extremely hazardous, only the over 300 that are listed in the section 302 column of the List of
lists. This database from PEMA should delineate more specifically a narrower range for both
Chlorine and Ammonia, thereby helping to determine whether the facility is over the threshold.
We were hoping that once this information was received, not only can we narrow down
the field of Chlorine users that are over 2500 lbs., but also we can then begin to search the other
RMP toxic substances listing. Even though we were verbally informed by PEMA that this info
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was obtainable, we received a recent E-mail from them explaining that we must go through each
individual LEPC to get specific “Off-site” plan chemical info. Based on this new information, a
new strategy needs to be considered. Perhaps, possibly sending questionnaires of general RMP
information to LEPC’s and in turn, informing them of the EPA information available to them.
Until this information is received, the current strategy by the CEPPO office is to take the
Tier II information and compare what Ammonia and Chlorine facilities definitely report over the
RMP thresholds and then compare this list to those that have already filed RMP’s. Based on this
diligent comparison performed by CEPPO, 20 facilities were identified as being remiss. CEPPO
has determined to issue these facilities a 15-day response letter that mandates that they answer
the informational request or are subject to fines/penalties under the Clean Air Act.
Some other possible sources that should be considered in the future are any local Fire
Department and Hazardous Material Units records and related industry suppliers and
associations.32 I am sure as we start looking at other counties, there may be specific industries
that are indigenous to them, that may have their own type of toxics and/or flammables. We’ll
have to study them on a case-by-case basis. Also, if needed, each individual county can be
contacted to verify the same information that was sent to the State, although this process could
be very labor intensive and for our purposes, may not be an effective management of time.33
One could also look at any of these databases for facility types (e.g. chemical distributors).
For the remainder of this region, and as a blueprint for any other region’s efforts to
attempt this same initiative, I am including a crosswalk checklist as an appendix to easily assist
others in possible identifications. Because these RMP plans need to be updated every 5 years,
this is an especially good time to send out information to all potential facilities. Not only will
32

Each 1 of 67 counties in the State of PA must have their own HazMat response unit, or 1 on retainer that could
respond with/in 2 hours
33
By soliciting individual LEPC’s, an incentive of information sharing can be utilized
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information serve as a reminder to current compliers, but also a tickler will help to bring any
facilities that “sit on the bubble.”
SUMMARY:
In addition to meeting my client’s goal of total RMP compliance, I feel many benefits
will come of this initiative. Besides the interactive cooperation that needs to continually
transpire between governmental agencies, information sharing both ways will yield some
expected and unexpected results. When emergency response entities plan together, a smoother
experience results should the real emergency happen. Obviously, this effort has served as a
blueprint for our future endeavors; hopefully it can be useful to others who need to accomplish
similar goals.
FINAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Because most of the individual LEPC’s have an intimate knowledge of what is in their
planning districts, it may be advantageous to enlist their assistance in this endeavor. If we can
provide some incentive to them to assist us, they may be more apt to be diligent about their
investigation. If we provide them some educational tools to assist us (e.g. giving them a current
listing of the facilities in their counties, providing them RMP info and thresholds, and showing
them how this could help them in their planning process), they may want to be proactive to bring
all of their potential non-compliers on line. Because many LEPC’s are understaffed and strictly
volunteer, this may be easier said than done, but it is worth the effort to at least try, if it hasn’t
already been done. Also, because of the political arena involved with some localities, this just
may not be possible.
We have just been informed that effective April 9, 2004, the new rule has been signed by
the EPA administrator, amending the submission and data requirements for the RMP program.
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As part of this rulemaking, EPA has clarified specific 5-year deadline requirements for the
updating of RMP’s. This rulemaking can be an opportune time to seek the LEPC help, by
informing them of these requirements and asking them if they would like to send out information
to their respective facilities. We plan to do just that in Philadelphia.
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APPENDIX “A”
(CHECKLIST FOR RMP SEARCH)

•

Research current “Envirofacts” from EPA website

•

Acquire “Tier II” database from State Emergency Response Commission (SERC)
o If necessary, individual counties may need to be contacted for verification

•

Acquire “Off-Site plan” database from SERC (If possible)
o If necessary, individual counties may need to be contacted for verification

•

Acquire corresponding OSHA region’s PSM inspection database

•

Using RMP criteria for toxics AND flammables, compare above info

•

If necessary, verification with facilities may be made either through phone calls,
informational letters (preferably certified mail) or through site inspections

•

Additional cross-referencing can be made with local Fire Departments, Hazardous
Material Response Units, or other local entities that have jurisdiction over chemical
storage, use or discharges (e.g. Water, Air, Health, &/or License Depts.)

•

Other potential cross-referencing could be accomplished through trade associations,
chemical suppliers or “non-government associations” (NGO’s) that may have
information for other purposes

•

Send out 5 year update information (due in 2004) to both previous filers & potential
future filers to bring everyone into the fold

•

Enlist LEPC’s assistance wherever possible
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